

4 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : University Study of Intelligence

1. The first point to recognize in considering university study of intelligence as a subject (or any studies of the intelligence process or of intelligence as a profession) is that intelligence is a "craft" (as Allen Dulles called it), an art, or a practice. It is not a discipline in the same sense as physics or chemistry. One can study what happens in intelligence work, how it happens, why it happens; one can discuss what ought to be in terms of morals, practical politics, or efficiency. But there are no objective natural laws, no single discipline, no professional mystique.

2. This not to say that the subject should be ignored by scholars, writers, thinkers, and students. As in medical practice or construction engineering, many disciplines are drawn upon, much experience has been accumulated, needs have led to practices, programs have been developed, and results and dangers need to be assessed. It is said of medical practice that a point was reached about 50 years ago when practitioners of medicine were for the first time doing more good than harm. The same might be said of intelligence practitioners - though probably with a date within the last decade. Now is probably a good time, therefore, to sum up and to evaluate what has been going on.

3. A book is needed, and an authoritative one. To use the academic terminology, it should be a book on the "theory" of intelligence, and it should cover both "descriptive theory" and "normative theory", that is, it should be a generalized report on intelligence systems in operation today and an evaluation of their value, uses, effectiveness, and proper place. Examples and detailed descriptions should be used to give life to the "theory" and not to "expose" secrets.

4. It is in some ways easier to say what such a book would not be than to say what it would be. Sherman Kent's Strategic Intelligence is still the best theoretical work in the field, but is confined to an American approach, to a part of the intelligence process, and to a fairly narrow definition of intelligence subject-matter. It says less about some things and more about others than a comprehensive theory of intelligence should. [REDACTED] books are scholarly, but not

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theoretical; they are largely research reports on the U.S. intelligence system. Lyman Kirkpatrick's books fluctuate between personal experiences and exposés on the one hand to defensive analysis of U.S. intelligence achievements on the other. He has not hit the right note yet. Allen Dulles's Craft of Intelligence does a great deal to illuminate techniques and the arts, but it is so interlarded with personal reminiscences and stories that it cannot be called a serious theoretical book so much as a good source book. Then there are the exposés, written by those outside or formerly on the inside, intended as money-making ventures pursued out of vindictiveness or sensationalism and written with minimal regard to standards of truth or balance.

5. To be authoritative, a theoretical book on intelligence should be written by some one who knows what the intelligence process really is and who has sufficient access regarding U.S. Soviet, British, and other systems that his generalizations are accurate. Unfortunately, that means in practice that it should be written by some one who is on the inside or has been on the inside and is trusted by those still there. That means that he may not be trusted by those on the outside who will read, study, and evaluate the book. Whatever he writes, he will be attacked by some as an apologist or mouthpiece.

6. The best way to minimize adverse criticism and to gain scholarly acceptance is for the book to be absolutely cold-blooded and apolitical in its descriptive theory; that is, it must not be defensive about the American intelligence system or its achievements and failures, and it must not be anti-Soviet or anti-Communist in its tone when discussing or referring to the Soviet system. In its normative theory it will be aiming at a largely American audience, but it will need to be just as critical of American intelligence organization, methods, operations, and personnel as of any other. The writer would need to be free to criticize or challenge the whole American system or any part of it.

7. What I have laid out is a big order, and not one that the Agency might be willing (or wise) to place. I, for one, am not at all certain that I would like to undertake such an effort. It would be a time-consuming and strenuous effort without any assurance that the final hassle with the protectors and defenders of the system would not result in destroying it.

8. The alternative of doing it entirely outside the system without any Agency assistance or access does not appeal to me very much either. It would be harder work, result in a less good book, and not eliminate a hassle in the last analysis anyway.

9. In sum, a good book on the theory of intelligence is needed, not only as a possible text for university study of intelligence but to improve the general public's knowledge and understanding. On the other hand, producing a book which would meet the standard of being a good book would be a difficult thing to do given the constraints under which both the Agency and the writer would operate.

10. There is still one other possible way to deal with the aim of "going public" in the universities without crossing a broad and fateful Rubicon. This would be to draw up a list of topics and speakers from among active employees and retirees (but, in my view, principally retirees since they would be under less restraint and probably more acceptable) who could and would conduct seminars or give lectures at universities. The subject matter could range rather widely and cover both substantive matters (the world situation, revolutionary movements in Latin America, the evolution of the Soviet system, developments in the Communist world, etc.) and the intelligence system (the supervision and control of intelligence organizations, definitions of national security, secrecy and security, etc.). It would be important that the persons chosen would be sophisticated, open, academically acceptable, and prepared to be critics of U.S. practice and policy rather than knee-jerk defenders.

11. A pilot program might be tried with a few people and a few subjects. It might be initiated, after the people and subjects are chosen, by a letter from the Director to a few universities or university centers for international studies. The letter would declare the Director's interest in lifting the veil from intelligence and in making more of the intelligence product and its people available to the academic community. It would state that certain former employees, at his request, had agreed to make themselves available, that they would be free to express their views in the same manner as any academic personnel (classroom lectures and seminar discussions always were privileged communications off the record), and that speakers and participants would be bound only from the disclosure of sensitive sources and methods. In conclusion, he would want to make clear that his interest was in neither defending nor promoting CIA interests, but in widening the understanding of intelligence and making better known its people and its product.

12. Such a program might, if it got off the ground, gradually build up a corpus of papers, doctrines, and persons gradually moving into the public domain which could later be codified into a collection and made available openly or selectively to centers of study in international affairs. But its success would depend upon how it was managed and how well it was done.

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4 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : C/T Program in Light of Analytic Training
Program Recommendations

1. The interim report which is being sent to you separately makes two references to the C/T's, but the program as a whole carries implications for the C/T program which I believe should be made explicit in this separate memorandum.
2. The two references to C/T's were (a) that they should take the recommended replacement for the IPC, namely, the Survey of Intelligence Collection and Processing, and (b) that they should take the Estimative Exercises. In each case we suggested that these courses be open also to new analysts. We suggested that the first of these courses be given to all C/T's; the second, by implication, was suggested as applying only to those C/T's destined for the analytic offices.
3. More important is the time sequence of C/T training. In my view the time sequence should be adjusted in the following ways:
 - a. All C/T's should take the Intelligence and World Affairs course, as at present, upon entry upon duty.
 - b. C/T's should then enter upon an interim assignment of 6-8 weeks duration (shorter than at present) in a directorates other than that of their preferred initial assignment.
 - c. All C/T's should then return to OTR for the Survey of Intelligence Collection and Processing, which would last about 5 weeks (shorter than the present IPC, with the analytic training parts removed). The underlying theory is that future managers, operators, and collectors as well as analysts need to know about collection, storage, retrieval, and the varieties of analytic processing which take place.
 - d. C/T's would then proceed to an interim assignment of 12-15 weeks in the directorates of their choice.
 - e. C/T's from the analytic directorates would then return to OTR and take the 2-week Analytic Exercises and a 3-week Survey of Analytic Methods. Estimative


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f. C/T's would then enter upon their duty assignments and, as would be the case with other analysts, return from time to time for particular courses and seminars related to analysts' development.

4. I recognize that the sequence I have set forth could create administrative problems because of divergencies which might derive from the existence of a different ideal sequence for those choosing operational or managerial careers. I am not, of course, familiar with the program for those C/T's. It has been my view that the existing IPC (a) comes too late in the C/T program, (b) carries too much load and runs too long, and (c) contains elements which have a broader value than that to the analytic C/T's alone. The sequence I have set forth and the courses proposed in the broader analytic development program are designed to remedy those defects. Hopefully, any new problems which a new sequence would pose can somehow be circumvented.



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